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DOES MACHIAVELLI PRESENT HIMSELF AS
MERELY A POLITICAL COMMENTATOR OR AS A
POLITICAL PHILOSOPHER AS WELL?

INTRODUCTION

	I concur with Dr.Adler and Max Weismann and I disagree with Bret Williams
and Paul Barnette.  Machiavelli is presently himself as both a political
commentator and a political philosopher.  He is saying this is how things
are done.  That is political commentary.  And he is saying he approves;
this is how they ought to be done.  That is political philosophy.  He does
not do either particularly well, though I will confine my comments to his
political philosophy.  I will try to show:

	(1) why he should be seen as a political philosopher and 
	(2) why he does not discharge that role well.

MAIN BODY

	In the PRINCE, the relationship of "goodness" and "utility or expediency"
is presented in terms of the demands of justice (goodness)  and the
maintenance of political power (expediency).

(A) MACHIAVELLI'S USE OF THE WORD GOODNESS

	The reason many people fail to see Machiavelli's claim to be a political
philosopher is that Machiavelli equivates on the word "goodness".

	At times, Machiavelli uses the word "goodness" synonymously with "utility"
or "expediency".  A single example suffices to illustrate this point.

(1) At the beginning of chapter 26, he writes: "With us there is great
justice, because the war is just which is necessary, and arms are hallowed
when there is no other hope but in them." (p.36)  I read him to be saying
here the necessity or expediency of the conflict makes it good.

	At other times however (perhaps the majority of times), Machiavelli uses
the words "goodness"  and "utility" or "expediency" in combination with
each another.  This usage strongly suggests that Machiavelli does not
always reduce one to the other.  Three examples seem to illustrate this
point.

(1)  At the beginning of chapter 12, he writes: "Having discoursed
particularly on the characteristics of such principalities...I propose to
discuss, and having considered in some degree the causes of their being
good or bad, and having shown the methods by which many have sought to
acquire them and to hold them..." (p.17)  I read him to be saying the
causes of the goodness of states is different from the methods by which
they were acquired and maintained.    

(2) At the beginning of chapter 13, he writes "These arms may be useful and
good in themselves..." (p.19)  I read him to be saying being useful and
being good are two different things.  I don't think he is being redundant.

(3) At the beginning of chapter 15, he writes "Hence it is necessary for a
prince wishing to hold his own to know how to do wrong, and to make use of
it..." (p.22)  I read him to be saying the goodness is separate and
distinct from utility.

	Why is this important?  If Machiavelli is presenting himself as merely a
political commentator, then we should never expect to see goodness used in
any way other than utility.  But clearly we do see such usage.  This is
strong evidence Machiavelli is presenting himself a more than a political
commentator.  He is presenting himself as a political philosopher.

(B) THE CLASSICAL TRADITION OUT OF WHICH MACHIAVELLI IS WRITING

	As a political philosopher, he is writing out a particular tradition.  It
is the classical tradition we associate with Greco-Roman-Christian society.
 All too often he assumes it and we forget it.  He might be forgiven for
his assumptions.  We would be reading amiss if we did not note them.  

	The principles of the classical tradition underlie Machiavelli's thinking,
though I believe he handles them very badly.  As evidence of this classical
underpinning, I cite his reference to certain "natural" and "common"
desires that are rooted in human nature. "The wish to aquire is in truth
very natural and common, and men always do so when they can, and for this
they will be praised not blamed..." (p.6)  This reference to natural
desires common to all men is the language of natural law.  It is the
underpinning of all ethical and political thinking.  It is the language of
the classical tradition.

	It is important to understand this tradition to understand Machiavelli and
to judge him.
 
	In this tradition, goodness is defined as the actualization of the
potentials that define a nature.  That is definition holds whether the
nature in question is the nature of man or the nature of the state.  Two
important things flow from that tradition.

	(1) The state is the creation of man.
	(2) The state exists to serve the needs of man.  

	How so?  Four points might help to understand why this tradition thought
this was the case and why it actually is so.

(1) All human beings are under a teleological and moral obligation to
actualize their human nature.  The classical tradition understands this
statement, and rightly so, to be a self-evident truth.  The tradition more
commonly uses the statement "the good is the desirable" but the two are
really different ways of saying the same thing.  I prefer this more modern
formulation because the self-evidence of the proposition is more easily
seen.  

Why is that basic statement self-evidently true?  That statement is just
another way of saying "I, as a human being, should be what I am."  And that
statement is a self-evident truth, because its denial is unaffirmable.  The
denial would be: "I, as human being, should be what I am not."  Now what
would that be?  "I, as a human being, should be an ape."  "I, as a human
being, should be an angel."  Both denials are non-sensical.  They involve
human being simultaneously affirming and denying his existence as a human
being.  They inviolate a human being violating the law of non-contradiction
which governs both thought and reality.

(2) Human beings actualize their human nature in a particular way.  That
actualization involves nothing less than the pursuit and possession of  

(a) all real goods my human nature needs, 
properly ordered (causal efficiency) and 
properly proportioned (moral virtue) which respect to each other 
so that each is truly good for me, and 

(b) all apparent goods I might want,
provided those goods do not interfere with my or any one else's pursuit or
possession of those very same real goods. (justice)  

As rhetorical shorthand, I might say that detailed obligation is the
obligation to become truly and fully human. In that context, becoming "
truly human" would be understood to mean the pursuit and possession of all
the real and apparent goods described above in the way described above. 
And becoming "fully human" would be understood to mean nothing less than
the pursuit and possession of those goods will suffice to satisfy man's
telelogical and moral obligation.  This shortform is helpful because human
beings and human nature are commensurate universals.  They are  defined in
terms of each other.  Human nature is really nothing more than the set of
potentials the actualization of which makes me truly and fully human.  The
pragmatic test of whether a person has successfully actualized his
potential is whether he is truly and fully human, or something less.

(3) Now, certain real goods human beings need to discharge their
telelogical and moral duty are beyond their individual powers to obtain. 
Primarily they are certain economic, social and political goods.  Human
beings can only achieve them by acting in concert with others.  

(4) The state is really nothing more than that concerted action.  Why is
that important?  It is action for a purpose.  It is action regulated by
justice.  It is action specifically aimed at the fulfillment of a
teleological and moral purpose.  That purpose is rooted in human nature. 
That purpose lays down the standard by which states are judged.  

This is what makes Dr.Adler and Max Weismann's comments on ends and means
so essential and so to the point.

(C) MACHIAVELLI'S RANKING OF GOODS

	As a political philosopher, Machiavelli discusses a very narrow range of
social goods.  They are two: the maintenance of power and the demands of
justice.  Machiavelli clearly thinks that the higher social good is the
preservation of power not justice.  

(1) At the beginning of chapter 14, he writes: "A prince ought to have no
other aim or thought, nor select anything else for his study, than war and
its rules and discipline; for this is the sole art that belongs to him who
rules..." (p.21)  Because justice is not even mentioned in the discussion
of the art of a leader, I read him implicitly to be saying the maintenance
of power is a good to be prefered to justice.  Machiavelli is crudely
expressing himself at this point, because he does seem to allow a
subsidiary role for justice. 

(2) At the beginning of chapter 15, he writes: "Hence it is necessary for a
prince wishing to hold his own to know how to do wrong, and to make use of
it...". (p.22)  I read him to be clearly saying two things: (a) the
maintenance of political power is a higher good than the demands of justice
and (b) the maintenance of political power justifies overriding the demands
of justice.   

	In his ranking of these two social goods, Machiavelli errs in the simplest
of ways.  It is an error that has to do with means and ends.  

(1) The end of the state is justice.  That is the end of the state is the
regulation of the pursuit and possession of all real and apparent goods so
that human beings can achieve their basic purpose in life of living well as
human beings.  

(2) One, and only one, of the means by which this end is achieved is the
preservation of political power.  As a social good, the preservation of
peace through force is, at best, a necessary but not a sufficient condition
for the establishment of justice.  

This is the core of Machiavelli's error.  He inverts the natural
relationship of the two goods.  He prefers means to ends.   It is the
simplest of errors, only a novice of a political philosopher would make. 
But Machiavelli makes it.  

This is what makes Dr.Adler and Max Weismann's comments on ends and means
so essential and so to the point

CONCLUSION

	Machiavelli clearly presents himself as political philosopher.  The fact
that he distinquishes between goodness and utility is persuasive evidence
of that point.  As a political philosopher, he is a novice.  His thinking
is by no means comprehensive or systematic.  His discussion of social goods
is very limited.  And that discussion involves the simplest and most
unforgiveable of errors.  

	At one point, Machiavelli cites Chiron, a creature half-man and
half-beast, as the model political teacher like himself. (p.25)  An apt
analogy.  For in doing so, Machiavelli makes the telling point.  His
political philosophy is the philosophy of dehumanization.  It does not make
us more truly and fully human.     


Robert SUTHERLAND

All citations, unless otherwise indicated are taken from Marriott's
translation of the PRINCE found in Volume 21 of the GREAT BOOKS.

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